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I.

INTRODUCTION

Hazardous substances disproportionally impact minority
c
e , a c a NN . A f 2014,
gh
e -five
percent of the United States superfund sites, could be found on land
in Indian Country.1 For Native communities, whose cultural
identities are intertwined with the land around them, harm to the
environment can be profoundly destructive. Professor Rebecca
Tsosie suggests that an Native world view can be def ed a : a
perception of the earth as an animate being; a belief that humans are
in a kinship system with other living things; a perception of the land
a e e a
he de
f he e e[.] 2 This world view sets
the foundation for understanding environmental harms in Indian
Country through an ecological model, studying interactions between
humans, animals, plants, and their physical surroundings.3 This note
examines harms caused to the environment greater than merely
disrupting a natural balance that previously existed, specifically
harms caused by noxious substances that are poisonous to the land.
The EPA website begins its Environmental Justice timeline
with the Memphis Sanitation Strike in 1968. 4 This civil-rights era
strike helped pave the way for later protests when a small African
American Community in Warren County, North Carolina was
e ec ed a a d
g e f P ch
a ed b he
( PCB ),
gathering national attention. 56 Protestors believed that Warren
Terri Hansen, Kill the Land, Kill the People: There Are 532 Superfund Sites in
Indian Country!, Indian Country Today, June 17, 2014,
https://intercontinentalcry.org/kill-land-kill-people-532-superfund-sites-indiancountry-24366 [https://perma.cc/879A-GAVH]; CERCLA is informally known
as the Superfund, which allows the EPA to clean sites contaminated from
hazardous waste, known as superfund sites,
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/what-superfund [https://perma.cc/CMM2-9357].
2 Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination:
The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 Vt.
L. Rev. 225, at 226 (1996).
3 I d a C
he ega e
f a f he ge g a h c e
g e ed
by a tribal government, and today is defined by federal statute at 18 U.S.C.
Section 1151. MELISSA L. TATUM & JILL KAPPUS SHAW, LAW, CULTURE &
ENVIRONMENT 19 (2014).
4 Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Justice Timeline, EPA.GOV,
www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/environmental-justice-timeline
[https://perma.cc/99T6-M36U] (last updated June 2, 2017).
5 Office of Legacy Management, Environmental Justice History, ENERGY.GOV,
www.energy.gov/lm/services/environmental-justice/environmental-justicehistory [https://perma.cc/H2FC-PHQD] (last visited November 15, 2019).
6 Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice in the 21st Century: Race Still
Matters, 49 PHYLON 151 (2001).
1
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County, and similar communities chosen for dumping hazardous
waste, were selected based on race and income. 7 In Environmental
Law in Indian Country, William Rodgers argues that Chairman of
the Yakama Nation, Alex Saluskin, first outlined the concept of
e
e a
ce he he
e Sae e
f The Ya a a
Indians in Defense of Their Vested Fishing and Property Rights as
Celilo Falls in the Columbia River that will be Destroyed by the
Construction of the Dalles Lock a d Da ( Sa
D c e )
in 1953.8 The thirty-seven page Saluskin Document pointed out the
disproportionate method used to measure the costs and benefits of
the Dalles Dam. 9 The Dam benefited a few, but planners neglected
to look at value the site had for the Native people. Celilo Falls, which
b
da
a da d
d e be a UNESCO W d He age
e, a c
de ed he Wa S ee f he We f he
e
b gh
d g NN . 10 11
On March 10, 1957, observers stood around Celilo Falls and
watched the water trapped by the newly completed dam rising to
drown the falls, silencing the previous roar, and destroying over one
h d ed f h g a f
a d d - e
a
.12 Today only
records remain of the names of hundreds of fishing spots
extinguished by the Dalles Dam.13 The Bureau of Reclamation and
the Corps of Engineers found that the ratio of benefits to cost for
building the dam, even if the Native Americans caught the
maximum amount of fish reasonable, was 1:22. 14 Unlike traditional
indigenous worldviews that consider connections between the
physical world, social welfare, and spirituality when making
decisions about how to use an environmental resource, Western law

Id.
1 William H. Rodgers & Elizabeth Burleson, Environmental Law in Indian
Country 381 (2005).
9 Id.
10 Tom Base, Proposal To Resurrect Columbia River's Celilo Falls Draws Flak,
NW NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 16, 2015), www.nwnewsnetwork.org/post/proposalresurrect-columbia-rivers-celilo-falls-draws-flak [https://perma.cc/46ZMUJU7].
11 Emily Alpert, Remembering Celilo Falls, THE DALLES CHRONICLE (July 10,
2006), https://www.thedalleschronicle.com/news/remembering-celilofalls/article_f6ab05c0-5593-11e9-8a39-a340f9430234.html
[https://perma.cc/T32T-UU3Z].
12 Rodgers, supra note 9, at 380.
13 Id. at n.71.
14 Id. at n.74.
7
8
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and policy does not contemplate this relationship. 15 The Saluskin
Document points out that the federal government did not consider
the cultural and religious significance of the Falls to the surrounding
Native community when making a decision, only the economic
gains of electric power from the dam. 16
This note examines harms caused to the environment greater
than merely disrupting a natural balance that previously existed,
specifically harms caused by noxious substances that are poisonous
to the land. By nature, harms caused by toxic torts are particularly
difficult to remediate adequately. A monetary number cannot
sufficiently remediate damages to the health of an individual, their
child, or the life of a loved one due to contact with hazardous
substances that are not properly disposed of or stored. Essentially
c ea g a c ched ea h effec , hese substances turn a once
valuable natural resource into a toxic well a permanently
dangerous contamination of the land or water that people must avoid
for their safety.
When the federal government commits toxic torts on tribal
lands by contaminating natural resources, NNs should be able to
bring FTCA claims to obtain damages. By creating the FTCA, the
U.S. government waived its sovereign immunity to allow private
citizens to obtain compensation when harmed by torts caused by the
government.17 Although the jurisdiction to sue the federal
government is broad, the FTCA is not without exceptions. One of
the most consequential exceptions is the Discretionary Function
Exception in § 2680(a) of the FTCA, which shields the government
from liability when there is a policy choice involved. When the
federal government assumes responsibility for an aspect of
governance or policy on NNs by requiring BIA approval and
controlling decisions in that aspect, there should be a carve-out
within the discretionary function exception. The Trust Doctrine,
combined with statutory requirements outlined in CERCLA and
RCRA, along with the duties to conserve health outlined within the
Robert A. Williams Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red Squirrel Pinatas, and
Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a Multicultural
World, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1133, 1164 (1994).
16 Supra note 15.
17 David S. Fishback, The Federal Tort Claims Act is a Very Limited Waiver of
Sovereign Immunity So Long as Agencies Follow Their Own Rules and Do
Not Simply Ignore Problems, 59 U.S. ATT YS BULL. 16 (Jan. 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2011/02/03/usab5901.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6VA-969T].
15
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Snyder Act, should overcome that exception, allowing NNs to bring
successful FTCA claims.
II. TOXIC HARMS AND TRIBES
In the opening scene of the 1980 film Rambo: First Blood,
S e e Sa
e cha ac e J h Ra b , eage
c
he
door of a house looking for his friend who served in Vietnam with
h ,
d c e ha h b dd G h e f
ed
Na ...
dd e e
. Ca ce a e h d
he b e. 18 This scene
was a reference to the toxic tort pollution Vietnam soldiers
experienced that would later result in the 1984 Agent Orange
settlement; at 180 million dollars, this was the largest settlement in
history and led the way for mass toxic tort litigation.19 Toxic Tort
claims are made when exposure to hazardous substances causes
injury, and the victim of that injury seeks redress from the person
who allegedly caused the exposure. 20
Generally speaking, a hazardous substance is an agent that
causes death or health problems, including behavioral and genetic
abnormalities, through direct or indirect contact. 21 The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
L ab
Ac ( CERCLA ) a
a S e f d, ha a
e

Rambo: First Blood (1982) Movie Script, SPRINGFIELD! SPRINGFIELD!,
https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/movie_script.php?movie=rambo-firstblood [https://perma.cc/6AWH-SYDE] (last visited Apr. 10, 2018); There are
many interesting parallels between Rambo: First Blood and the history of
indigenous peoples in the United States. The character, Rambo, according to the
second film is part Navajo. In the first movie, although he contributed greatly to
the United States military efforts by serving in Vietnam as a Green Beret, he
was harassed by U.S. law enforcement, who treated him with contempt. U.S.
a e f ce e
ga ed a agg e
e
a
, ead g
he h a e, The
de f
b d,
e.
Likewise, indigenous people have routinely been victims of U.S. aggression. In
spite of the great contributions made by indigenous people to national security
interests of the United States by serving in the military at a higher percent than
any other ethnic minority, and the specific contribution as wind talkers, a vital
aspect in WWII, along with suffering radiation exposure to mine the uranium
necessary to get ahead in the nuclear arms race, the U.S. legal system has failed
to provide justice in return.
19 Ralph Blumenthal, Veterans Accept $180 Million Pact on Agent Orange, N.Y.
TIMES (May 8, 1984), www.nytimes.com/1984/05/08/nyregion/veterans-accept180-million-pact-on-agent-orange.html [https://perma.cc/M95Q-CFE4].
20 Anthony Z. Roisman, et. al., Preserving Justice: Defending Toxic Tort
Litigation, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2004).
21 29 CFR § 1910.120.
18
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exhaustive definition, including about 800 substances.22 This Act
also allows for agencies to have the discretion to designate
additional substances as a hazard when necessary. 23
Bringing a Toxic Tort claim against a citizen defendant can
be difficult because plaintiffs must find evidence that establishes
causation and find credible expert witness testimony that relies on
published scientific studies. 24 Plaintiffs bringing a case against the
government must overcome additional threshold requirements to
gain redress, making the process more complicated than against a
private individual or entity.
Tribes, Toxic Harms, Difficulties with Recovery
The American West is known for its pristine national parks and
is an increasingly popular tourist destination for those seeking
outdoor activities such as hiking, rock climbing, and rafting. 25 Still,
little is known about how these same landscapes have also been
desecrated in a way that directly effects the health of the
communities who first lived there and continue to do so. This section
tells the story of how the federal government directly contaminated
two Native Nations in the Southwest and then considers possible
means of redress.
1. Navajo Nation Uranium
In March 1979, the Three-Mile Island spill in Pennsylvania
received national attention. The New York Times documented the
ch
g f he gh a e, efe g
a he
acc de
he
a e ce
h
f h c
'
c ea
e
g a . 26 In July of that same year, the largest nuclear spill in U.S.
42 U.S.C. § 6921, 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7412, 15 U.S.C. § 2606.
42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (Westlaw current through P.L. 116).
24 Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation,
86 NW. U. L. REV. 643 (1992).
25 Jenny Rowland Shea and Nicole Gentile, Outdoor Recreation Is Big Business,
A State Scorecard and Policy Menu for Growing the Outdoor Recreation
Economy in 11 Western States, Center for American Progress (September 27,
2017)
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2017/09/27/439530/outd
oor-recreation-big-business/ [https://perma.cc/6K8Z-VKC4].
26 B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Three Mile Island: Notes From a Nightmare, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 1979), www.nytimes.com/1979/04/16/archives/three-mile22
23
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history occurred at Church Rock, New Mexico.27 Over 1,100 tons
of uranium tailings and approximately 100 million gallons of
radioactive wastewater was dumped into the Rio Puerco River on
the Navajo Nation when a mud dam failed. 28 More than three
months later, The Ne Y
T e e
ed Na a W
ab
Ua
P
f R e . 29 The outraged protestors and
demonstrators reacting to the Three-Mile Island spill did not make
an appearance for the Navajo people.
The site was created decades ago, during the nuclear arms
race, when the United States government was developing the
Manhattan project. The majority of the United States uranium
supply came from the southwest region of the country.30 During the
era of the uranium boom, from the late 1940s to the 1970s, men in
the local Navajo community were inclined to work in the mines
because they were near to their homes, and there were few other
a a ab e. A he
e, ad a
dd
a ae
he
Navajo language. 31 Being an isolated community with little
knowledge about the hazards of the mining occupation, most of the
people were unaware of the long-term health risks.32 By the late
1930s, policymakers and scientist knew radon was hazardous. 33In
spite of the Treaty of 1868 between the Navajo Nation and the
United States, forming a trust relationship where the Navajo Nation
expected the United States to have their best interest, the United
States did little to prevent the following public health crisis from
radon exposure.34
island-notes-from-a-nightmare-three-mile-island-a.html [https://perma.cc/8P7KDUF6].
27 Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation:
Redressing the Legacy of Radioactive Contamination for Native Peoples and
Native Lands, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 203, 217 (2015).
28 Id. (citing Barbara Rose Johnson, Susan Dawson & Gary Madsen, Uranium
Mining and Milling: Navajo experiences in the American Southwest, INDIANS
AND ENERGY: EXPLOITATION AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST
111, 117 (Sherry Smith & Brian Frehner eds., 2010)).
29 Navajos Worry About Uranium Pollution of River, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18,
1979), www.nytimes.com/1979/11/18/archives/navajos-worry-about-uraniumpollution-of-river.html [https://perma.cc/PPF2-RVTU].
30 Doug Brugge & Rob Goble, The History of Uranium Mining and the Navajo
People, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 92 (2002),
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3222290/ [https://perma.cc/K28PZWGJ].
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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2. San Carlos Apache Agent Orange
In the 1960s and 70s, the United States Forest Service
sprayed an herbicide containing dioxin called Silvex along the
fifteen-mile portion of the Gila River running through the San
Carlos Apache Reservation. 35 Silvex is the name used in the U.S. for
2,4,5-Trichlorophenoxyacetic acid, an insoluble substance used to
destroy broad leaf plants by essentially interfering with the growth
hormones vital to photosynthesis. 36 This substance was combined in
equal parts with 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid to create Agent
Orange, used in the Vietnam War. 37 According to the U.S.
Geolog ca S e ( USGS ), he Re e a
a e ec ed
for efficiency purposes; permission from multiple landowners was
not necessary for the project, only approval from the BIA.38 This
action was part of an assignment called the Gila River Phreatophyte
Project, which was created to reduce the vegetation believed to
consume too much of the water necessary for the growing city of
Phoenix.39 This vegetation included not only the invasive salt cedar
species but also the native Phreatophyte, such as the local
cottonwoods and black willows that benefit the flow of the river,
protect the quality of water, and stabilize the banks. 40 Unfortunately,
Silvex destroyed both indiscriminately.

Tanya H. Lee, Poisoned Lands: San Carlos Apache Indian Reservation
Steeped in Dioxin, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Mar. 16, 2017),
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/poisoned-lands-san-carlosapache-indian-reservation-steeped-in-dioxin-ICSCFZkJxEeNPCV0RdDthQ/
[https://perma.cc/5NJJ-F3MK].
36 U.S. National Library of Medicine, 2,4,5-Trichlorophenoxyacetic Acid, NAT L
CENTER FOR BIOTECH. INFO. PUBCHEM COMPOUND DATABASE,
www.pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/2_4_5trichlorophenoxyacetic_acid#section=Top [https://perma.cc/JK2J-63K9].
37 Jeanne M. Stellman and Steven D. Stellman, Age
O a ge D
g he
Vietnam War: The Lingering Issue
fI C
a a d M a Hea h I ac , 108, n. 6 (June 2018).
38 Supra note 36.
39 R.C. Culler et. al., Objectives, Methods, and Environment-Gila River
Phreatophyte Project, Graham County, Arizona, 655 A GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
PROF. PAPER (1970), https://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/0655a/report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Q5K-TK99].
40 Pa. La d T
A
, The Science Behind the Need for Riparian Buffer
Protection, CONSERVATIONTOOLS.ORG, http://conservationtools.org/guides/131the-science-behind-the-need-for-riparian-buffer-protection
[https://perma.cc/Z94J-9W5N] (last visited November 15, 2019).
35
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The Phreatophyte project did not only destroy the delicate
and complicated riparian buffer zone but also left toxic
contaminants.41 The San Carlos Apache believe that these
c a
a
ha e ha ed he c
hea h
h da .42
After decades of Agent Orange litigation, science shows that dioxins
can cause major health problems such as birth defects and cancer. 43
In the neighboring town of Globe, Arizona, local non-Indian
residents who had been sprayed by Agent Orange brought a class
action suit against Dow Chemical and settled for an undisclosed
amount in 1981.44 The class action arose when the United States
Forest Service sprayed Kuron, a defoliant related to Agent Orange
on the Pinal Mountains of the Tonto National Forest in an attempt
to diminish foliage and increase water runoff between 1968 and
1969.45
Considering tha he B ea
f I d a Affa
( BIA )
approved the Phreatophyte program, there is a possibility that the
Bureau and the U.S. forest services could be liable for failing to
warn of the potential harms caused by dioxins. Although non-Indian
residents of Globe were able to get compensation for harms resulting
from Agent Orange, the United States, as a trustee of the San Carlos
Apache, neglected to ensure that the residents of the reservation
were safe from the spraying. If military victims of Agent Orange
were able to find redress, as well as the Globe residents, surely there
must be a route for compensation for the tribal members harmed by
the same toxic substance. 46 If the perpetrators who created the toxic
tort situation on the San Carlos Apache Reservation or the Navajo
Nation were a private company, the NNs would be able to sue them
for exposure as private tortfeasor. Even though the FTCA was
originally designed by Congress to provide a route for plaintiffs
harmed by government tort actions, the obstacles here for tribes to
gain compensation is the Discretionary Function Exception within
the statute. The federal government has a heightened responsibility
Supra note 38.
Supra note 41.
43 Richard Stone, Agen Orange s Bi er Har es , 315 SCIENCE 176 (Jan. 12,
2007), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/315/5809/176
[https://perma.cc/6BU3-8CYL].
44 Herbicide Case in Arizona is Settle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 1981),
www.nytimes.com/1981/03/05/us/herbicide-case-in-arizona-is-settled.html
[https://perma.cc/T9SH-DZW8].
45 Id.
46 Supra notes 18, 38.
41
42
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to tribes as opposed to the responsibilities of private companies, yet
the DFE allows the government to have a stronger defense from
liability than private tortfeasors. This note argues there are various
legal regimes that create duties and obligations for the government.
On their own, these regimes create limited remedies, and should be
read together with the FTCA to allow Native Nations to obtain
compensatory damages at least equal to what they could obtain from
a private company.
III. HOW TRIBES CAN RECOVER
Keeping in mind the history of environmental degradation
committed by the federal government on land assigned to the
dc
f NN , h ec
add e e h NN ca
e a
recover monetary damages. Part A summarizes the Federal Tort
Claims Act and explains why it is an important tool for NNs to use
because of their unique status as quasi-sovereign nations within the
United States. Part A then explains the exceptionally challenging
burden of overcoming the Discretionary Function Exception. Part
B(1) outlines first the way NNs have struggled to overcome the
DFE, and then circumstances where Tribes have been able to
overcome it. Part B(2) will distinguish these situations.
A. Legal Barrier: The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
1. FTCA Basics
Because of the historical discriminatory treatment of Native
Nations in respect to environmental torts, the FTCA is a valuable
procedural tool for these nations to obtain remediation in and around
Indian Lands. The discretionary function exception, which is
discussed in this chapter, is a significant hurdle that must be
overcome to gain compensation through this act. On account of the
unique relationship between Native Nations and the federal
government, courts should consider the duties of the government
agency under the trust responsibility when analyzing whether the
contested action falls under this exception. If the action does not fall
under the exception, NNs can bring a successful FTCA claim.
P
he FTCA a age 1946,
a e c e ee g
redress for injury caused by federal government agencies or
227

employees had to lobby congress for private rights of action. 47
Congress was inundated by private claims bills consuming much of
the H e
e a d b dge f he b
d ced a d
a a
percentage passed. 48 B
a
g he U ed S a e G e
e
Sovereign Immunity and conferring administrative settlement
authority upon federal agencies and jurisdiction upon federal courts,
the FTCA attempts to relieve Congress of the burden of creating
private rights of action and provide justice to those who have been
harmed by government negligence. 49
Section 2672 of the FTCA authorizes the head of any federal
agency to settle claims cognizable under the FTCA and allows such
agencies to use alternative dispute resolution methods. 28 U.S.C §
2677 authorizes the United States Attorney General to arbitrate,
c
e,
e e
ca .C g e
b de
e e ed b
essentially substituting its duty to confer rights of action for private
citizens to administrative agencies and the judicial system. 50
Under the FTCA, the United States is liable for torts in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
similar circumstances.51 The primary difference, however, is that the
United States cannot be held liable for interest prior to judgment or
for punitive damages. In the case of death, where a state jurisdiction
may only allow for punitive damages, the federal government shall
be liable for actual or compensatory damages.
Six conditions must be met in order to hold the United States
liable under the FTCA. 52 The e c d
a e: 1) The c a
be against the United States; 2) The claim must be for monetary
damages; 3) The damages claim must be for injury or damage to or
loss of property, personal injury, or death; 4) The wrongful actor
must be federal employee; 5) The wrongful actor was acting within
David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV.
291, 293 (1988-1989).
48 H.R. 562, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (January 14, 1942); 88 Cong. Rec. 313-314
(1942).
49 State Farm Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d 737, 738 (1st
Cir. 1949)
50 Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress to
Accompany S. 2177, S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
51 28 U.S.C. § 2674
52 Erin Murray Watkins, The Scope of Employment Requirement of the Federal
Tort Claims Act: The Impropriety and Implications of the Montez Decision, and
the Superior Jurisdictional Prima Facie Approach, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 533,
538 (2009-2010).
47
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the scope of his office or employment, and; 6) Under the
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
he ac
cc ed. 53
To bring a FTCA claim, the plaintiff must be sure that the
administrative remedies through the agency have been completely
exhausted.54 The plaintiff must present an administrative tort claim
to the appropriate government agency for adjudication before filing
suit in federal court.55
The fede a g e
e
ab
de e
ed b he a
of the state where the act or omission occurred. 56 The federal
g e
e ' ab
he a e a e a d
he a e e e
a a
ae d d a
de
ec c
a ce ... 57 and Premature
claims are not actionable. 58
2. The Discretionary Function Exception
The strongest defense against an FTCA claim is the
Discretionary Function Exception (DFE). Exceptions to the FTCA
c de [a] c a . . . ba ed
he e e c e
ef
a ce
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
he he
he d c e
ed be ab ed. 59 This means that
even if the federal entity is abusing its discretion, it cannot be held
ab e. The DFE a de g ed
ec he G e
e f
liability that would seriously handicap efficient government
ea
, a d ha c
ed d
that.60
The test for the Discretionary Function Exemption is
announced in Berkovitz v. U.S., where a user who contracted polio

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Westlaw current through P.L. 116-73).
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112113 S.Ct. 1980, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993).
55 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (Westlaw current through P.L. 116-73).
56 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Westlaw current through P.L. 116-73); Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962).
57 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Westlaw current through P.L. 116-73).
58 Thompson v. United States, 215 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1954).
59 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (Westlaw Current through P.L. 116-73).
60 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1858, 10 L.Ed.2d
805 (1963).
53
54
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after using a polio vaccine sued the National Institute of Health. 61
The Supreme Court held that:
he a g age,
e, a d eg a e h
f he
discretionary function exception, as well as its
interpretation in this Court's decisions, establish that
the exception does not preclude liability for any and
all acts arising out of federal agencies' regulatory
programs, but insulates from liability only those
governmental actions and decisions that involve an
element of judgment or choice and that are based on
b c
c c
de a
. 62
In Berkovitz, the Court first determined whether the action was a
ch ce. [T]he d c e
a f c
e ce
a
he
a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a
c
e f ac
f a e
ee
f
. 63 If there is no
opportunity to choose, there is no discretion. When a government
action is challenged under the FTCA, the court must consider
whether the employee had to follow a specific course of action. 64
When policy, procedure, or the law compels an employee to choose
a course of action based on their own judgement, not because of
protocol, the first prong of the Berkovitz test is met.65
Second, Berkovitz specifies that the discretionary choice
be he
d ha he d c e
a f c
e ce
a
de g ed
h e d. 66 The legislature created the discretionary
f c
e e
d c a ec d-g e
g f eg a e a d
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political
c h gh he ed
f a ac
. 67 The decision
further clarified, stating that courts should focus on whether the type
of action taken is subject to a policy analysis by nature, not on the
second prong of the Berkovitz e
he age
b ec e e .

61Berkovitz

v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531(19
88).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 536.
64 Id. at 542.
65 Id. at 545.
66 Id. at 536.
67 Id. at 537.

230

The Supreme Court has held that regulatory activity by an agency
falls within the DFE.69
The DFE is a defense that has been used in ways that seem
almost shocking in light of the facts. On September 26, 1950, a
United States Navy ship began spraying a mysterious substance into
the air roughly 2-miles from the Northern California Coast, near the
thriving city of San Francisco. 70 This was the beginning of a six-day
e e c e, ca ed O e a
Sea-S a b he U.S.
a
simulate and study the effects of germ warfare on a major city. 71 The
substance, also deposited along the Golden Gate Bridge, was a
peculiar strain of bacteria called Serratia marcescens.72 At the time,
the military believed the bacteria was harmless to humans, and it
was ideal for tracing because it left bright red spots on foods it
infected.73 This belief that it was harmless proved wrong a week
after the test when eleven local residents checked in to Stanford
University Hospital suffering from urinary tract infections. 74 As
doctors investigated, they discovered the source, a pathogen with a
bright red hue, Serratia marcescens.75 Edward Nevin, recovering
from prostate cancer, died from a bacterial heart infection a month
after the Sea-Spray experiment.76
After the experiment became public knowledge, his family
brought an FTCA claim for wrongful death, claiming that he died
beca e f he
a
ac
O ea
Sea-Spray.77 In this
case, Nevin v. the United States, The Ninth Circuit held that the
68

United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 104 S.Ct.
2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984).
69United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 111 S.Ct.1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991
).
70 Helen Thompson, In 1950, the U.S. Released a Bioweapon in San Francisco,
SMITHSONIAN INST. (July 6, 2015), www.smithsonianmag.com/smartnews/1950-us-released-bioweapon-san-francisco-180955819/
[https://perma.cc/JM8X-YZU5].
71 Id.
72 J dge s Decision E pec ed Soon in California Germ Warfare Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 15, 1981), www.nytimes.com/1981/04/15/us/judge-s-decisionexpected-soon-in-california-germ-warfre-case.html [https://perma.cc/5K8ADHZN].
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Richard P. Wheat et. al., Infection Due to Chromobacteria, AM. MED. ASS N.
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. (Oct. 1, 1951),
www.jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/555999
[https://perma.cc/W77W-AWZE].
76 Id.
77 Id. at n. 73.
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United States Government was protected from liability by the
discretionary Function Exception. 78 The Court considered whether
the decision was made at a planning level, making it discretionary,
and if judicial review would impair effective administration of
government.79 Because the decision to use that particular strain of
bacterium was made by the Chief Chemical Operator at the planning
level, and the court not equipped to weigh the factors that led to the
policy choice, the decision was protected by the discretionary
function exception.80
Although the previously decided case, Varig Airlines made
it clear that it was the nature of the conduct, not the status of the
actor, that determines whether or not the DFE applies, the 9th Circuit
pointed out that the higher the rank of the official making the
decision, the greater the likelihood policy implications are
considered.81
The Nevin ca e d ec affec NN ab e
cce f
bring an FTCA toxic tort case. In Begay v. United States, Navajo
plaintiffs suffering from the Radiation exposure discussed above
brought an FTCA claim, asserting that U.S. agencies were negligent
because they failed to warn of radiation damage, and did not
establish and enforce rigid safety standards. 82 The plaintiffs also
alleged that a study performed by the United States Public Health
Service (PHS), looking for radiation exposure, was negligent
because of failure to warn miners of possible radiation damage. 83
The 9th Circuit upheld the district court holding that creating and
enforcing standards, as well as choosing not to warn participants in
he PHS
d
e e ba ed
dge e
a d he ef e
discretionary.84 The court followed the logic of Nevin, holding that
the PHS decision to not tell miners about health hazards for fear they
would quit, resulting in interruption of uranium production, thus
jeopardizing national security, was protected because high level
government officials were making discretionary policy choices. 85
Even though the nature of the conduct is what determines if the
discretionary function exception applies, the 9th Circuit has
Nevin v. United States, 696 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1230.
80 Id. at n. 79.
81 Id.
82 Begay v. U.S., 768 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1985).
83 Id. at 1060.
84 Id. at 1065-1066.
85 Begay v. U.S., 591 F.Supp. 991, 1011 (1984).
78
79
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affirmed with Nevin and Begay that the higher ranking the official
is, and the level of national security impacts at stake heightens the
likelihood that the DFE will apply. Clearly, the policy interest the
c
c ce ed
h
ec g he fede a g e
e
ability to make policy decisions that might sacrifice the lives and
health of a minority for the sake of protecting the larger U.S.
population. Yet such logic, when applied too generously, results in
Korematsu type holdings that have not withstood the test of time. 86
From a practical perspective, advocates attempting to
overcome the DFE must bolster arguments that the policy decision
is non-discretionary, making clear distinctions from Begay and
Nevin. To make such distinctions, advocates for native nations
should argue that the official making the decision was not
comparably high ranking and there was no national security interest
considered. For example, in the case of the San Carlos Apache, the
phreatophyte program was for the purpose of making the water flow
more efficiently to the city of Phoenix, not to combat an outside
threat. Advocates should not rely on such distinctions but recognize
ha he a e a fac
he c
dec
.
Native Nations and the Discretionary Function Exemption
1. How Native Nations have been able to overcome the
DFE
Although Begay e e a a e a
e fh
NN ha e
been hindered from recovering due to the DFE, there are
c c
a ce he e NN
e ca e he DFE
cce f
b g
FTCA claims in both the 9th Circuit and the D.C. Circuit. In the 9th
Circuit case, the Court held that because the government had
de ead c
e he NN
gg g ac
, he had a d
to ensure basic safety measures. Although the government had
discretion over granting the contract, the DFE did not shield the
government from negligence. In the D.C. Circuit Case, the Court
held that the DFE did not protect the actions of government agents
acting outside the scope of their authority. Since Courts have
a
ed NN
FTCA c a
a dc
de he f d c a d
of the government in these ca e , NN h d be ab e
cceed
bringing FTCA claims for toxic torts as well. Statutory duties that
86

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2423, 201 L.Ed.2d 775 (2018).
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prevent the government from committing toxic torts can be found in
CERCLA and RCRA. As will be discussed later, because CERCLA
is remedial, this moral duty combined with the statutory duties of
CERCLA and RCRA should be enough to overcome the DFE to
b g a FTCA c a
beha f f NN . The f
g
ca e ,
Marlys Bear Medicine and Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians are
examples of when Native Nations have successfully brought FTCA
claims and have been able to overcome the DFE.
a. Marlys Bear Medicine v. U.S. ex rel. Secretary of Dept.
of Interior
In Marlys Bear Medicine,87 the Department of the Interior,
through the BIA, had a responsibility under federal regulations and
statutes to manage the forest and logging activities on the Blackfeet
Reservation.88 The BIA authorized a contract between the NN and a
logging company to do business on the reservation. 89 In the contract
there was a safety provision ensuring the right of the BIA to inspect
and suspend the business operations if the company did not comply
with the contract.90 Leland Kicking Woman, was fatally injured
while working on the site for the logging company. 91 Kicking
W a
e a e b gh a FTCA claim against the BIA for
negligence.92
The district court held that the DFE barred this claim but the
9th Circuit reversed, saying that even though the DFE is designed to
a d d c a ec d g e
g
e ded
c ea e
inconsistent liabilities between private and government employees
ef
g de ca ac . 93Although federal statute requires the
BIA to consider factors such as economic impacts when authorizing
timber sales on Indian Land held in trust, there is no instruction on
how to weigh these factors, ultimately allowing the agency to have
discretion.94 Because the statute leaves the agency with a choice, the
decision to grant the contract with the logging company is protected

Marlys Bear Medicine v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 241 F.3d 1208 (2001).
Id. at 1211.
89 Id. at 1212.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1211.
92 Id.
93 Supra note 88 at 1213.
94 Id. at 1214.
87
88
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by the DFE.95 On the other hand, failing to ensure safety even
though the responsibility was assumed by the BIA in the contract is
not protected by the DFE. 96 The 9 h C c c c ded ha [ ]he
Government cannot claim that both the decision to take safety
measures and the negligent implementation of those measures are
ec ed
c dec
. 97 If the government undertakes
e
b
f a
ec
afe , he DFE ca
hed ef
from liability for failing to fulfill the assumed requirement. 98 The
9th Circuit also recognized that when a fiduciary duty exists, the
United States has an obligation to act in the best interest of the
beneficiary, in this instance, the Blackfeet Nation. 99 Because the
BIA ha
e a e a d c
ehe
e c
e he Na
logging, it had a duty to ensure basic safety measures.100
b. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States
As the sun rose on May 19, 1979, a group of dissident Red
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians seized several hostages on their
reservation in an uprising protesting actions taken by the chairman
of their Nation.101 After BIA and local law enforcement personnel
contained the insurrection to one building, a single FBI agent,
responding to a request for assistance, unilaterally ordered the
withdrawal of all law enforcement from the premises.102 Although
the hostages were eventually released, the NN claimed it suffered
e da age f
a e f ce e
e ac a
.
The g e
e a g ed ha he FBI age
ac
ee
protected by the DFE because he had a duty to act in favor of
protecting human life, and the FBI had a policy to not assume a
peace-keeping role on the Reservation. 103 As established law found
that government decisions are only protected by the DFE if they
involve discretion and use policy considerations, Circuit Judge Bork
ea ed ha beca e a g e
e
ff c a ha
d ce
Id.
Id. at 1215.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1219.
100 Id. at 1219-1220.
101 Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. U.S., 800 F.2d 1187, 1187-88 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
102 Id. at 1190.
103 Id. at 1193.
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violate the binding laws, regulations, or policies that define the
e e
f h
ff c a
e
he ca
be
g he
e f
discretion the DFE was designed to protect when committing such
violations.104 The g e
e
defe e c d a
f he FBI age
had merely ordered other FBI agents to leave, but because the agent
had ordered all law enforcement off the premises, and he did not
have the authority to do so, he was acting outside the scope of his
authority. Since he was acting outside the scope of his authority, his
actions were not protected by the DFE.
Here, if an agent of the BIA makes a decision that results in
a toxic tort injury on a NN, then the NN, as a sovereign, should
verify that the federal agent had the authority to do so. If there is no
source of authority for the agent to permit such actions, then the
age
dec
ca
be
ec ed b he DFE, a d he NN
should be able to bring a successful FTCA claim.
When a federal agent has acted within the scope of their
authority, a statutory duty is required in order to overcome the DFE.
Such statutory duties to behave in a way that prevents the
government from committing toxic torts can be found in CERCLA
and RCRA. Because CERCLA is remedial and RCRA only allows
for injunctive relief, these statutes alone are not enough to provide
compensatory damages for tribes. The Indian Trust Doctrine creates
a moral responsibility for the federal government to protect Native
Nations. This moral duty combined with the statutory duties of
CERCLA and RCRA should be enough to overcome the DFE to
bring a FTCA claim on behalf of NNs.
2. Path to Recovery: Finding a Non-Discretionary Function
The Civil Rights Era brought forth a wave of environmental
justice concerns grounded in the concept that access to clean air and
water is a basic human right. Considering indigenous environmental
justice in the same vein as the rest of other underrepresented groups
is an oversimplification. Native Nations (NN) possess an advantage
a he
e
b
, e ab hed b he S e e
Court during the foundational years of the United States.

104

Id. at 1197.
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a. The Trust Doctrine
The original rationale for the Indian Trust Doctrine was first
outlined by Chief Justice John Marshall in Cherokee v. Georgia,
he e he def ed NN a
d e c de e de
a
. 105
Marshall noted that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution
contained a recognition of the sove e g
f NN a d he
exclusive right to give and to execute the law within that
b
da . 106 In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall further explained
he e a
h , a g ha he a
f NN a ha f a a
claiming and receiving the protec
f e
e
ef , h e
they maintained their national character and right to govern
internally.107 Chief Justice Marshall derived this framework from
the express and implied terms in the treaty relationship between the
NN a d he U ed S a e Government, which can be referred to
as a sacred trust. 108 Because of this framework, the United States
had a duty to protect the rights of the Cherokee Nation. 109 In the
following cases, the Courts have found that this responsibility of the
U ed S a e
NN
b d g.
Under the Trust Doctrine, the United S a e ha cha ged
itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust.
Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in
dealings with the Indians, should, therefore, be judged by the most
e ac g f d c a
a da d . 110 Although the moral responsibility
the United States holds because of the Trust Doctrine has been
be ef c a NN , he S e e C
ha a
e e ed he T
D c e
h d fede a
e
e NN .111 Because the Trust
D c e efe
he
de e de
a e, he S e e C
found that it was a source of congressional power to unilaterally
ab ga e a ea
he ece a
ec NN . 112 The power

106

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831).
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 7.
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Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 555 (1832).
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Robert A. Jr. Williams, People of the States Where They Are Found Are
Often Their Deadliest Enemies: The Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights
and Federalism, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 981 at 996 (1996).
109 Id.
110 Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
111 Rebecca Tsosie, Conflict Between the Public Trust and the Indian Trust
Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Indians, 39 TULSA L. REV.
271, at 275 (2003).
112 Id.
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of Congress to unilaterally abrogate treatie
a Pe a
P e . 113 In United States v. Kagama, the Supreme Court utilized
he T
D c e c f
C ge
ab
e ac he Ma
Crimes Act, abrogating treaty rights to allow federal jurisdiction
over Indian on Indian crimes, where the federal government had no
jurisdiction before.114
In addition to the Trust Doctrine, the Supreme Court has
ed he C
e ce C a e f he C
a d C ge
power to make laws to enforce and execute treaties to reinforce
C ge
P e a y Power over Indian affairs. 115 This plenary power
extrapolated from the Trust Doctrine is in direct conflict with the
understanding of the trust doctrine as a way to limit federal actions
that infringe on the sovereignty of Native Nations to govern internal
affairs.116 In later cases, such as Seminole v. United States, the
Supreme Court found that the Trust Doctrine provides that the
United States uphold treaty obligations with the level of
responsibility a private fiduciary would owe an individual whose
assets they were responsible for managing. 117
With the contemporary understanding of the Trust Doctrine,
there are three different levels of duty the federal government is
responsible for ensuring to Native Nations. 118 These can be
described as a general trust
c e, a
ed
e
b
,
and a full fiduciary relationship. 119
The first is the general trust principle, which is used when
there are no specific statutes that create distinct federal duties for the
goal of the statute. 120 This general trust principle is one that
ec g e he g e
e
b ga
ec Na e Na
.
Although not consistently used, the general trust principle provides
a valuable canon of construction for courts to apply when
interpreting legal duties. Because the general trust principle is not

Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in
Indian Affairs, 63 UCLA L. R . 666, 679 (2016).
114 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1886).
115 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 TULANE L.
REV. 509, at 521-522 (2007).
116 Tsosie, supra note 114, at 275.
117 Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 297.
118 Tsosie, supra note 114, at 276.
119 Id. at 276, 277.
120 Id. at 276
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completely enforceable by courts, it is considered to be a broad
a b ga
. 121
Under a limited trust responsibility, the government has
enacted broad statutes containing duties necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the legislation. If the federal government fails to meet the
statutory obligation of performing the required duties, Native
Na
a
e f
dec a a
c e e ef
c
e
ef
a ce. 122 W h h e e f
e
b
, NN a e ot
entitled to compensatory damages.
The h ghe e e f
e
b
e
e NN
compensatory damages. According to United States v. Mitchell
( Mitchell II ), a f d c a e a
h
f
d he e he U ed
States, through statutes and regulations, created duties and standards
particularly designed to financially benefit Native people. The court
found that the relationship came from the language in statutes that
expressly supports a financial responsibility by the government, as
well as the extent that the government controls the assets. The court
said that if the fiduciary language was not there when the
government took elaborate control over tribal monies or property, a
fiduciary trust relationship necessarily exists.123 Although though
the case in Mitchell II addressed a situation where statutes specified
duties of the federal government to manage timber assets in a way
that considered financial goals for Native People, the decision
suggested that even without such statutory language, when the
government has extensive control of a property, there is a fiduciary
duty. To get monetary compensation from the government for the
b each f a f d c a d , NN
be ab e
de f a
substantive source of law that mandates specific duties.
The highest level of trust responsibility should be implicated
when the BIA, which should comply with CERCLA and RCRA,
fails to do so and causes harm to the health of Native American
communities. Although these are general statutes, the Snyder Act,
as interpreted by the 8th Circuit in Blue Legs v. EPA, creates an
absolute duty. If the Snyder Act creates an absolute duty for the BIA
to expend money to comply with federal hazardous waste
regulations, then it could potentially be used to overcome the DFE.
Id.
Supra note 121.Rebecca Tsosie, Conflict Between the Public Trust and the
Indian Trust Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Indians, 39
TULSA L. REV. 271, 276.
123 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
121
122
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b. The Snyder Act
For cases involving the BIA, the Snyder Act can create a
duty for the BIA to comply with RCRA, and potentially
CERCLA.124 Under 25 U.S.C.A. §13, the BIA can expend money as
a
ae f
e
e, a C g e ca , f
he be ef ,
ca e, a d a
a ce f I d a
h gh
he U ed S a e f
ec f c
e
ed
he ac . (C a
) F e ef f d e
a dc e a
f hea h
he
ee a
e
ed f
he g a f h N e beca e ha a d
b a ce
NN a d
highly threatening to the health and wellbeing of Native
communities. (citation)
The 9th Circuit held that programs administered for the
benefit of Indians under the Snyder Act must be liberally construed
in their favor.125 In Blue Legs v. EPA, as later discussed, the 8th
Circuit found that when the BIA creates an injury that harms the
health of the community it had a duty to take care of, the Snyder Act
obligates the BIA to remedy that injury, beyond the proportion of
the harm the BIA caused. 126 Potentially then, when the BIA
approved Silvex to be sprayed on the San Carlos Apache
Re e a
, he Age c
a ha e a ab
e duty to relieve
stress and conserve the health of that community.127 Snyder is
important to keep in mind because it could be used to argue that the
BIA had a mandatory duty to relieve the distress on a reservation for
health purposes, and used to overcome the DFE in an FTCA claim.
CERCLA and RCRA: Limited, But Helpful
On its surface, if analyzed in a vacuum without any historical
or social context, the trust responsibility appears to be a sufficient
legal doctrine that would prevent the federal government from
committing outrageous toxic torts on Native land, or at a minimum
a
ed e f NN
ha ha e bee
ed b he fede a
g e
e . Af e a , he fac ha he U ed S a e ha
de a

Mark J. Connot, Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs: An
Expansion of BIA Duties under the Snyder Act, 36 S.D. L. REV. 382, 399
(1991).
125 Fox v. Morton, 505 F.2d 254, 255 (1974).
126 Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1100
(8th Cir. 1989).
127 Id.
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humane and self-imposed policy charged itself with moral
b ga
f he h ghe e
b
a d
, e b c d
be
e h g ha b h
d a
ea g e a
a d be a
progressive members on the court and in politics agree on. 128 The
actuality is that the courts in the modern era have failed to uphold
the federal-tribal trust relationship consistently. 129
Finding a mandatory duty is fundamental to overcoming the
DFE.130 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, the court reviewed
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and followed
ad
a
de ce, a g a a e, eg a
,
c
leaves it to a federal agency or employee to determine when and
how to take action, the agency is not bound to act in a particular
manner and the exercise of its authority is discretionar . 131 To
e c e he DFE, NN
f
a e , eg a
,a d
policies that are mandatory. For example, some statutes outline how
Native Nations specifically are to be treated regarding regulation
and will be discussed below.
Several federal environmental laws allow the EPA to treat
NN a a e (TAS)
e e e
e a
g a . The
a
ha e e
de g a e NN TAS a a e he C ea A Ac
(CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), and Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA).132 Although the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
(EPCRA) d
e
NN , he EPA h gh age c
adjudication has determined that these acts allow tribal
participation.133 NN a e ea ed a
ae
ega ds to
response-related functions, including notification of releases,
consultation on remedial action, access to information, and roles and
responsibilities under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) and the
Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 286 (1942).
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court,
40 HUMAN RIGHTS MAG 4 (Oct. 1, 2014), available at
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_
home/2014_vol_40/vol--40--no--1--tribalsovereignty/short_history_of_indian_law/ [https://perma.cc/KP77-VL5Y],
(Citing United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) and United States
v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011)).
130 Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1180 81 (9th Cir. 2005).
131 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, (quoting United States v.
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991)).
132 Tribal Assumption of Federal Laws - Treatment as a State (TAS), EPA
Environmental Protection Agency, (Jan. 17, 2018), www.epa.gov/tribal/tribalassumption-federal-laws-treatment-state-tas [https://perma.cc/68LH-GZDD].
133 Id.
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Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA). 134 The Resource Conservation and
Rec e Ac , (RCRA), h e e , d e
a
NN
be ea ed
a
ae , e e
g NN f
e e c g he
eeg
implement their own hazardous waste programs. Through RCRA,
the federal government maintains substantial involvement over
managing tribal land and natural resources.
1. CERCLA
The
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as the
Superfund, was enacted in 1980 to manage the release of hazardous
substances. The Act is a federal government program run in
conjunction with the states to remediate and clean up hazardous
materials.135 To repair harmful conditions caused by improper
disposal of poisonous chemicals, CERCLA holds the parties
responsible for the situation accountable, requiring them to be liable
for cost and cleanup. 136 The government is not liable for
compensatory damages through CERCLA. While CERCLA is
remedial and designed to correct past harms, RCRA is preventive,
designed to address present and potential threats. 137
2. How Indian Nations have used CERCLA
CERCLA provides only enough funds to care for the cost of
cleaning up a site, not for torts resulting from the hazardous
substances found within. Considering the vast amounts of harms
these sites create to the health of local communities, CERCLA alone
ade a e
add e
NN . The f
g ca e
illustrate how Native Nations have been able to use CERCLA and
RCRA to their advantage, but the solution is insufficient.

Tribal Land Cleanup Laws and Regulations, Environmental Protection
Agency (May 19, 2017), www.epa.gov/tribal-lands/tribal-land-cleanup-lawsand-regulations [https://perma.cc/8BH8-ZSVZ].
135 Karen A. Gottlieb, Toxic Torts Practice Guide, Spring 2017 Edition.
136 U.S. v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 200 F.3d 143, 148 (3rd Cir. 1999).
137 S.C. De
f Hea h & E
.C
.C
e ce & I d . I ., 372 F.3d
245, 251 (4th Cir. 2004).
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a. The Ya a a ( A G

g Fa

)

The Yakama Nation is surrounded on three sides by
Superfund sites. To the east is the Hanford Nuclear Reservation,
north is the Holden Mine site on Lake Chelan, and south are the
Bradford Island, Harbor Oil in North Portland, and Portland Harbor.
According to the Treaty of 1855, the Yakama Nation has dominion
over the territories in Oregon and Washington, guaranteeing rights
over ceded land even if the lands are not part of the reservation.
The Hanford Nuclear Reservation was established in the
1940s to produce the plutonium that was used in the first nuclear
bomb, and today it is the most contaminated nuclear site in the
United States.138 Daily, the site poisons groundwater and the toxic
liquid is actively leaking into the Columbia River. 139 Because the
Nation secured fishing rights in 1855 to fish local rivers,
contamination in the Columbia River is a major impediment to their
subsistence.140 The EPA currently has an advisory against eating
fish from a heavily polluted ten-mile stretch of water, and adequate
cleanup is necessary to ensure the Yakama have healthy fish to feed
their families.141
The Yakama recently won a judgment in the District Court
of Oregon to recover the costs spent on containing the contamination
at the Bradford Island site. The court found that under CERCLA, the
Ya a a
e
ed
ec e a c
f e
a
e ed al
action incurred by the . . . Indian tribe not inconsistent with the

Walter Pincis, The Explosive Cost of Disposing of Nuclear Weapons, THE
WASHINGTON POST (July 3, 2013), www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/the-explosive-cost-of-disposing-of-nuclearweapons/2013/07/03/64f896e0-e287-11e2-80eb3145e2994a55_story.html?utm_term=.5a24c21466dd [https://perma.cc/794CN8NP].
139 Karina Brown, Surrounding Nuclear Site, a Natural Treasure Under
Fire, Homepage COURTHOUSE NEWS (June 28, 2017),
www.courthousenews.com/surrounding-nuclear-site-natural-treasure-fire/
[https://perma.cc/2529-5NEB].
140 Ericka Cruz Guevarra, Yakama Nation Demands Accountability f For
Columbia River Sewage Spills, OR. PUB. BROAD. (2017),
www.opb.org/news/article/columbia-river-sewage-spill-yakama-nation-salmon/
[https://perma.cc/WQX3-B7PU].
141 Steve Law, Yakama Nation Demands More Rigorous Cleanup of Superfund
Site in Portland Harbor, Pamplin Media Group (Jul. 25, 2016),
https://pamplinmedia.com/sl/316234-195510-yakama-nation-demands-morerigorous-cleanup-of-superfund-site-in-portland-harbor- [https://perma.cc/R9YAQD3N].
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a

a c
ge c
a . 142
The Yakama Nation has spent vast sums of money defending
their reserved fishing rights first acquired under the Treaty of 1855.
After securing their fishing rights, they have been compelled to
protect their subsistence by responding to the hazardous substances
leaking into the Columbia River where the fish live. The Yakama
has spent resources monitoring, assessing, and evaluating the
e ea e f ha a d
bstances and potential impact on the
e
e ,a d
he hea h a d e fa e f ba e be . The
Yakama organized these actions to mitigate damage to the
environment, actions that did not just benefit them, but also the nonIndian communities surrounding.
The United States has admitted to disposing of hazardous
wastes in and around the Bradford Island site and directly into the
Columbia River. The Yakama has incurred $99,798.32, verified and
documented, for response actions to this contamination.143 Because
he Ya a a ac
eec
e
h a Na
a C
ge c
Plan (NCP), they are entitled to recover the verified and documented
expenses they incurred reacting to the hazardous wastes leaks under
CERCLA § 9607(a)(4)(A), with interest. 144 There is no mention in
this case, however, of the Yakama recovering damages for the fish
e
ce he
a a e
f he g e
e
ac
.
b. Navajo Nation
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. LLC v. United States, the United
States argued that it was not liable for cleaning up a mine site
because they have Sovereign Immunity and only own Fee Title of
the Navajo Reservation. 145 Because their ownership interest is
limited to holding the land in trust for the Navajo, they argued that
they were not culpable because they were not the owner. The Circuit

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
Yakama Motion for Summary Judgment, Turtle Talk,
turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/20-yakama-motion-for-summary-j.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S82X-VYJZ].
144 Yakama Nation v. United States, No. 3:14-CV-01963, 2016 WL 406344 (D.
Or. Feb. 1, 2016).
145 Supplemental Brief for El Paso Nat. Gas Co. at 3, El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v.
United States, No. 3:14-cv-081650-PCT-DGC, 2017 WL 2405266 (D. Ariz.
June 2, 2016), available at https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2017/08/16/federalcourt-holds-us-govt-is-owner-of-indian-trust-land-under-cercla-for-liabilitypurposes [https://perma.cc/AUR3-PQLK].
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Court disagreed and held that the United States waived its Sovereign
Immunity to the extent it is liable under CERCLA and ordered more
briefing from both the United States and the El Paso regarding who
the land on the reservation within the meaning of the statute. After
additional briefing, the Court found that although the Navajo Nation
has substantial property interests, since the Navajo Nation cannot
exclude the United States government from the reservation, and
does not hold the power to supervise, alienate, and abrogate, it is not
responsible for mine cleanup under CERCLA. As the fee titleholder,
h he
e
e e,c
a e a
, a d a e, he U ed
States is the owner under the purposes of CERCLA, and is
responsible for the costs of cleaning up the mine site.146 The Court
decided not to determine at this time if the United States can limit
the amount they are liable based on their fiduciary role.
3. RCRA
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, RCRA is a
c
ehe
e eg a
che e g e he ea e ,
age,
a dd
a f ha a d
a e . 147 creates a right of action for
citizens harmed by the federal government in three instances. The
first is enforcing violations of permit standards or regulations,
second, by abating imminent and substantial endangerments to
health or the environment, and third, by forcing the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to perform a nondiscretionary duty. 148
In reality, RCRA is the common name for a 1967
amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965. In Subtitle C,
RCRA outlines the hazardous waste management program, while
Subtitle D defines the solid waste management program. 149 As
Subtitle C is currently written, the EPA directly implements
hazardous waste programs, regulating the production,
transportation, treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste in Indian

Id. at 9.
Environmental Defense Fund v. E.P.A., 852 F.2d 1316, 1318 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
148 Ricky Nelson, Covert RCRA Enforcement: Seeking Compensatory Damages
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for Environmental Regulation, 42 ENVTL. L.
909, at 911-912 (2012).
149 Id.
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Country.150 If the EPA administrator deems it appropriate for the
hazardous waste program, he or she is authorized to enter into an
a
a ce ag ee e
h IN
de 42 U.S.C. 6908a. RCRA
limited in its ability to benefit tribes because it does not provide
compensatory damages the same way an FTCA claim might, but
only allows for injunctive relief.
a. H

NN ha e

ed RCRA

In Blue Legs v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, the estate of private citizen and enrolled member of the
Oglala Sioux Nation, Maddie Blue Legs, brought a claim under
RCRA seeking an injunction to end the improper maintenance of
dumpsites on the Reservation by the Environmental Protection
Age c ( EPA ), he BIA, I d a Hea h Se ce ( IHS ), a d
Oglala Sioux Nation. The district court recognized that the NN had
a responsibility to comply with standards for open dumping of solid
waste. Under RCRA, the NN has the same authority to implement a
solid waste program as a municipality. 151 Because hazardous
substances can cause more harm, there are heightened regulations
regarding the management of hazardous waste, therefore the EPA
ha
c ge
a
[c fe ed] a h
e ha a d
waste.152
Importantly, the BIA and IHS argued that RCRA did not
obligate them to participate in compliance efforts.153 By
administering facilities that dispose of hazardous and solid wastes,
both the IHS and BIA supervise activities the RCRA regulates. 154
Because IHS and the BIA administer programs that deal with the
disposal of substances RCRA is meant to govern, the court held they
had to comply with RCRA standards. 155 Additionally, the court
found that the Snyder Act, which directs the BIA to expend
a
a ed f d f
he e ef f d e a d he c e a
f
hea h,
e aff a e d e ha he BIA
g
a ed
Fred E. Breedlove, Implementing the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) in Indian Country and Approaches for Amending RCRA to Better
Serve Tribal Interests, 26 VT. L. REV. 881, 894 (2002).
151 Blue Legs v. U.S. E.P.A., 668 F. Supp. 1329, 1338 (D. S.D. 1987), aff d s b
nom. Blue Legs v. BIA, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
152 Blue Legs, 668 F. Supp. at 1339.
153 Id. at 1098.
154 Id. at 1099.
155 Id.
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in its management of hazardous substances on the reservation. 156
Although the BIA has some discretion over how to use allocated
funds, when the agency causes harm for the beneficiaries of the
Snyder Act, it has an absolute obligation to remedy the wrong.157
This duty extends beyond the proportion of the harm caused by the
BIA. Blue Legs leaves open the possibility that RCRA could be
interpreted to create a full fiduciary duty since the government has
full comprehensive control over hazardous waste that by nature
affec NN a a e
ce .
b. Common Principles Between the Indian Trust
Doctrine and FTCA
The Indian Trust Doctrine is a valuable concept for Native
Nations because it sets forth duties required by the federal
government. Although the Indian Trust Doctrine is helpful, it is
limited. The problem is that in spite of the potential to benefit tribes,
Courts have not consistently applied the doctrine. Although the
doctrine created a fiduciary duty for the federal government to
manage a historic site in White Mountain Apache v. United States
ba ed a 1960 act, the same doctrine did not find a statutory duty
from the Navajo Hopi Rehabilitation Act for the Navajo to invoke
in the face of evidence of corruption by the Secretary of the
Interior.158 Such discrepancies feed the perception in Indian Country
that the Indian Trust Doctrine is not a cause of action that can be
e ed
c
. The ef e, NN ee g c
e a
c d
have greater success in bringing an FTCA claim than a breach of
trust action. The Trust Doctrine should still be used by courts
adj d ca g FTCA c a
b gh b NN
e e a e
favorably for tribes to find a statutory duty, overcoming the DFE.

Id. at 1100; 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1998).
Blue Legs, 867 F.2d at 1100 (citing Morton citing Cf., Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 94
S.Ct. 1055, 1075, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974)) (BIA must act consistently with their
trust obligations); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp.
252, 256 257 (D.C. Cir.1973) (Secretary of the Interior must administer
Reclamation statutes as to minimize adverse impact on Indian Reservations).
See also, White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 555 (S.D. 1977) aff'd 581 F.2d
697 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (IHS must provide care where state cannot).
158 88 Act of Mar. 18, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86 392, 74 Stat. 8 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 277 (2000)1960 Act); United States v. Navajo Nation II, 556 U.S. 287,
299 (2009).
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I he h
f fede a I d a La , NN ha e had
overcome major obstacles to hold the government accountable for
damages caused by actions or failure to act by U.S. agents who were
responsible for ensuring the wellbeing of the NN. According to
Mitchell II, for a plaintiff Nation to gain monetary reparations, it
f da
ce f eg a
ha ca fa
be e e ed as
mandating compensation by the federal government for the damages
a ed. 159 In Navajo Nation v. United States, the NN sued the
Sec e a
f he I e
f fa g ac
he Na a Na
be
interest.160 The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) assigns
responsibility to the Secretary of the Interior to approve leasing
ag ee e
be ee he IN a d
ae c
a e . 161 When the
Navajo Nation attempted to negotiate a leasing rate of 20 percent of
gross proceeds, Peabody coal directly contacted the Secretary of the
Interior.162 After meeting with representatives from Peabody coal,
the Secretary of the Interior then postponed his approval of the lease,
and told parties to reconsider. Ultimately, he approved a lease for
only 12 percent of gross proceeds. 163 The Navajo Nation then sued,
ca
g ha h
a a b each f he Sec e a
d
ac
he
Na
be
e e . 164
Despite the Trust Doctrine, the Supreme Court held that
because the IMLA does not create a comprehensive regulatory
regime, it is not substantive law, therefore it cannot be used to
eaf d c a d
he fede a g e
e
ac IN be
interest.165 This reasoning is akin to the DFE, where unless plaintiffs
can find substantive law that leaves no room for discretion, the
United States cannot be held liable for a tort.
The Supreme Court in Berkovitz stated that the DFE does not
a
he he e
a fede a
a e, eg a
,
c
specifically prescribes a cour e f ac
. 166 In White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. United States, the Nation sued the United States for
failing to fulfill its obligations to manage and care for a historic
a
e
he NN a d. Congress, in 1960, had specified that
he e be held by the United States in trust for the White Mountain
Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 218.
Navajo Nation v. United States, 537 U.S. 488, 493 (2003).
161 Id.
162 Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 497 (2003).
163 Id. at 488.
164 Id. at 489.
165 Id. at 507.
166 Berkovitz v. U.S., 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
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Apache Tribe, subject to the right of the Secretary of the Interior to
use any part of the land and improvements for administrative or
school purposes for as long as they are needed for the purpose. 167
There was no dispute that the Secretary utilized that right and that
the government occupied the property, creating at the minimum a
plenary control over the property equivalent to the control exercised
by the United States in Mitchell II.168 Because there was statutory
language outlining that the United States would keep the property in
trust, the court found that the government had a duty. Since the U.S.
government allowed the historic site to fall into disrepair in spite of
the legislation, the White Mountain Apache was able to sue the
government for monetary damages. Although the Berkovitz test is
arguably stricter, finding statutory language outlining a standard is
key to both overcoming the DFE in FTCA claims and finding a
fiduciary duty in claims made against the government on behalf of
NN .
Because RCRA and CERCLA outline comprehensive duties
for the United States government regarding the cleanup of
ha a d
b a ce , NN a e e
ed
e a da age . If he
federal government has failed to adhere to the duties in RCRA, the
United States has breached its full fiduciary duty. Protecting the
health of reservation residents is a sovereign interest under the
Supreme Courts framework, and if the United States has substantial
control over the regulatory scheme governing cleanup of toxic
substances on tribal land and fails to adequately remedy the
, NN ca b g a Pa e Pa ae FTCA c a aga
he
federal government.169

88 Act of Mar. 18, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86 392, 74 Stat. 8 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 277 (2000)). Pub. L. 86 392, 74 Stat. 8 (1960 Act).
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White Mt. Apache Tribe v. United States United States, 537 U. S. 465, 475,
123 S.Ct. 1126, 155 L.Ed.2d 40 (2003).
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Parens Patriae is a doctrine allowing a state to bring a suit on behalf of
citizens to protect quasi-sovereign interests. See e.g., Jack Ratliff, Parens
Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1856 (2000) (noting that Parens
Patriae is a doctrine allowing a state to bring a suit on behalf of citizens to
protect quasi-sovereign interests).
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Statutory Regimes are Non-Discretionary when Conjoined
with the Trust Doctrine
1. Abreu v. United States: How does the statutory scheme
fit?
Direct violations of RCRA cannot be used to bring FTCA
ca
beca e
de ce ha c c ded ha
d be d ec
e f ce e a he d Abreu v. United States.170 When courts look
at claims brought under the FTCA, they must determine if damages
liability would undermine an already-in-place statutory regime.171
The First Circuit discussed the need for interpreting the waiver of
sovereign immunity of some statutes in context with other statutes
that provide a remedy. 172 The First Circuit focused on the Supreme
C
h d g United States v. Fausto, where the Court held that
federal employees who were denied remedy by the Civil Service
Ref
Ac ( CSRA ) c ld not then obtain a remedy through the
Bac Pa Ac ( BPA ). 173 Because Congress enacted the CSRA as
a comprehensive statutory scheme to address the problems of
ha ha a d a a ge e
, he CSRA de ed d c a e e
de
the Tucker Act and Back Pay Act.174 In Abreu, the Court also looked
to their obligation to interpret waivers of sovereign immunity
narrowly.175 Since the RCRA is a comprehensive statutory regime,
and the court must construe the FTCA waiver of sovereign
immunity narrowly, the court concluded that plaintiffs could not
bring an FTCA claim for violations of RCRA.176
2. Myers Overcomes the Discretionary Function
Exception...For Now
The FTCA enables private parties to hold the United States
liable for tortious conduct but for many private citizens harmed, the
discretionary function exception serves as the primary defense for
the government to prevent adequate compensation. The DFE
protects the federal government from liability for tortious actions
See Abreu v. United States, 468 F.3d 20, 30 (1st Cir. 2006).
Id. at 30.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 455 (1988).
175 Abreu, 468 F.3d at 30.
176 Id. at 31.
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when an agency or a federal employee caused the tort while acting
with discretion. The DFE cannot apply when the agency or
individual acts outside of making a discretionary choice, such as
failing to comply with specific duties outlined by legislation. When,
however, plaintiffs have attempted to bring FTCA claims and
overcome the DFE based on direct violations of RCRA, the First
Circuit found that allowing so would undermine an already-in-place
statutory regime.177
In Myers v. United States, the plaintiff overcame the DFE by
citing agency policy based on a specific statute (RCRA). The Myers
plaintiffs sought compensatory damages from the United States
through an FTCA claim for negligence. 178 The plaintiffs were
parents whose young daughter was injured after allegedly being
exposed to thallium in soil leaked from a landfill, managed by the
Na , ea he e de ce a d he ch d ch .
The plaintiffs in Myers overcame the discretionary function
exception because the Ninth Circuit found that the Navy failed to
comply with two internal mandatory provisions. The first of these
mandatory provisions was a safety and health program manual
(Program Manual)179 implemented by the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (Naval FEC). The second was a cleanup
plan, known as a Federal Facility Agreement (FFA)180, where the
Navy was responsible for designating a Quality Assurance Officer
(QAO) to verify that the plan was followed. Looking to Bear
Medicine to determine the second provision,181 the court found that
language within the FFA was not mandatory, but scientific and
professional judgment matters, especially regarding safety are not
e
c c
de a
he ef e he d c e
a f c
does not apply.182
Ricky R. Nelson argues in Covert RCRA Enforcement183 that
Myers sets forth a way to use RCRA to overcome the discretionary
function exception as long as the use is indirect. Myers got around
Id.
Myers v. United States, 652 F.3d 1021, 1027 (9th Cir. 2011).
179 Na al Facili ies Eng g Command, U.S. Navy, NAVFACINST 5100.11J 1,
Safety and Health Program Manual (2000) [hereinafter Program Manual].
180 U.S. De
f Def., U.S. De
f he Na & S a e f Ca f
a, Ca
Pendleton Marine Corps Base Federal Facility Agreement (1990).
181 Ma
Bea Med c e . U ed S a e e e . Sec
f he De
f I e r,
241 F.3d at 1208, 1213-17 (9th Cir. 2001).
182 Myers v. United States, 652 F.3d 1021, 1032 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Abreu, by citing Agency Policy that was based on RCRA. Likewise,
advocates for those who have been harmed by toxic torts potentially
covered by RCRA should look for internal agency standards and
guidelines that prohibit the action that caused damage.
3. Introduce the Trust Doctrine to Give Myers More Bite
An alternative strategy to argue that under FTCA, damages
liability does not undermine CERCLA or RCRA, but is necessary to
reinforce these statutes in instances involving NNs where the trust
doctrine creates a duty, it reinforces these statutes. Neither Myers
nor Abreu, however, addressed situations regarding Native Nations,
where the United States has a heightened duty of responsibility.
In Indian Towing Co. v. U.S., the Coast Guard used
discretion in deciding to operate a lighthouse. 184 Once the Coast
Guard exercised this discretion, it had a duty to use due care. 185 The
fede a g e
e ha f
e
b
a age I d a
e
ce a d a d f
he be ef
f he I d a . 186 When
government agencies take on the responsibility to oversee certain
a ec f a ag g he e
ce f NN h gh he De a e
of the Interior, the government has a heightened duty of care, as the
court found in Marlys Bear Medicine.187 In a situation like San
Carlos, where a federal agency contaminated a reservation by
directly infecting the land with a toxic chemical after approval from
the BIA, surely the BIA was exercising comprehensive control
parallel to the control exercised in Marlys Bear Medicine.
Additionally, the Snyder Act should impose a duty on the BIA to
remedy the harm, as the court held the agency had a duty to do so in
Blue Legs v. EPA. Once the government understood the harms
Agent Orange exposure caused, the BIA and Forest Service should
have taken steps to remediate the reservation and warn the
community about potential health hazards.
If he a ff
Myers were able to win a FTCA claim by
merely citing internal agency policy, the Trust Doctrine should be
able to create a heightened duty of enforcement for RCRA and
CERCLA. If the
a
b a da age
h gh c e
e
of RCRA and CERCLA, government agencies will eventually claim
Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 62 (1955).
Id. at 64.
186 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224.
187 Marlys Bear Medicine, 241 F.3d at 1220.
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that like Abreu, enforcing FTCA liability for non-compliance with
agency policy that mirrors statutes, would undermine statutory
regimes.
Whe defe d g e f aga
NN , he U ed S a e ha
bee ab e
ca
ha he d
ed ch ce a d c e
a ,
unless there is a distinct piece of legislation outlining a duty, such
as in United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe.188 When
reviewing torts from hazardous substances on tribal lands, however,
the courts should look at violations of broad environmental statutes
such as CERCLA and RCRA combined with considerations of the
S de Ac
b ga
f he BIA
c e e hea h, a d he
heightened duty of the United States under the Trust Doctrine to
overcome the DFE.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the book of Matthew, Jesus said that it was easier for a
camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter
the kingdom of heaven. Winning an FTCA claim in federal court is
just as difficult.189 Apparently, neither are impossible, but in spite of
the case law and theory that creates a plausible legal argument to
support claims on behalf of Native Nations against the federal
government for toxic torts, the realistic probability of being
successful in federal court is slim.
Biblical scholars have been debating the interpretation of the
h a e h gh he e e f a eed e a e a he a a
f
ca e f decade .190 S
a , he d scretionary function
exception has become the most litigated provision of a much
ga ed a e .191 The United States, though, took on a moral duty
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d f ed b
de ce
af e he c
ce
. 192
This moral duty should be considered by courts looking to apply the
DFE in specific circumstances regarding Native Nations. Because
significant case law bolsters the legal argument for Nations to
successfully overcome the DFE bring toxic tort FTCA claims, the
Trust Doctrine should create a full fiduciary relationship, or, at the
minimum, a limited trust responsibility. As seen in Marlys Bear
Medicine, where the DFE could not be used to protect the federal
government from liability inconsistently from how a private
defendant would be liable, the DFE should not protect the United
States from liability for egregious toxic torts in Indian Country.193
****
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Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 297.
Marlys Bear Medicine, 241 F.3d at 1213.

254

